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Non-technical Summary 
 
Given the substantial consolidation pressure in tax dependent government budgets, voluntary 
contributions play an increasing role in the financing of activities related to welfare, culture or 
education. There is hope that voluntary giving may at least partially become a stable substi-
tute for tax financing. Tax revenues are highly sensitive to economic growth and the business 
cycle. Hence, a first question arises as to which extent voluntary giving is equally sensitive to 
the business cycle. Insofar it is less elastic compared to taxation it might contribute to a more 
stable financing of public goods over the business cycle. A second question relates to the 
long-run impact of trend growth on giving and to the extent to which giving benefits from the 
augmentation of an economy’s economic resources. If the long-run growth elasticity of ag-
gregate giving is large, this result would point to a yielding source of finance whose impor-
tance can be expected to grow with an expanding economy.  
Therefore, this paper analyzes the sensitivity of aggregate giving to both business cycle de-
velopments and trend growth. In this respect it contributes to fill a blank spot in the charitable 
giving literature. The study applies time series modeling which follows approaches developed 
to analyze the tax revenue-growth-nexus. This cointegration modeling takes account of a pos-
sible long-run link between income and giving which may temporarily interfere with cyclical 
fluctuations. The resulting error correction specification allows disentangling the short-run 
(business cycle related) from the long-run (potential growth related) income elasticity. These 
tools are applied to data on US giving for a forty-year period (1968-2008) for the aggregate of 
total giving and for its subcomponents (individual, corporate, foundation giving, and charita-
ble bequests).  
With tax revenues as a point of reference, US giving constitutes indeed a relatively stable 
source of revenue. Total giving is characterized by a business cycle volatility which is compa-
rable to the moderate one of indirect taxes. However, this overall finding is composed of the 
respective sub-components’ very different short-run GDP-elasticities. Whereas individual and 
in particular corporate giving is quite sensitive to cyclical fluctuations, foundation giving and 
charitable bequests tend to stabilize total giving over the business cycle. This cyclical buffer 
function of charitable bequests and foundation giving has so far been overlooked in the litera-
ture. 
The results for nominal (and even more for real) long-run growth also paint a favorable pic-
ture: giving benefits in or even above proportion from an augmentation of economic resources 
in an economy. This holds for foundation giving in particular which is highly elastic to nomi-
nal and real long-run growth. 
The comparison of the finding to the well researched micro-elasticities points to the possible 
existence of social multipliers in the case of US giving: the macro estimates for the income 
elasticities lie in the upper band of the micro-estimates. This is consistent with a social multi-
plier view according to which individual giving is mutually reinforcing. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Angesichts des Konsolidierungsbedarfs in steuerfinanzierten öffentlichen Budgets spielen 
freiwillige Spenden eine wachsende Rolle in der Finanzierung sozialer, kultureller und bil-
dungsbezogener Aktivitäten. Es besteht die Hoffnung, dass private Spenden zumindest teil-
weise die Steuerfinanzierung als stabile Finanzierungsquelle substituieren können. Steuerein-
nahmen reagieren sensitiv auf Wirtschaftswachstum und konjunkturelle Schwankungen.   
Damit stellt sich zunächst die Frage, bis zu welchem Grad auch Spenden sensitiv auf Kon-
junkturschwankungen reagieren. Insoweit sie weniger elastisch als Steuereinnahmen reagie-
ren, können sie zu einer stabileren Finanzierung öffentlicher Güter über den Konjunkturzyk-
lus beitragen. Eine weitere Frage betrifft den Einfluss langfristigen Wachstums auf das Spen-
denaufkommen und das Ausmaß, in dem das Aufkommen von der Zunahme der Ressourcen 
einer Volkswirtschaft profitiert. Mit einer höhen Wachstumselastizität des aggregierten Spen-
denaufkommens wäre zu erwarten, dass die Bedeutung der Spendenfinanzierung mit einer 
Ökonomie wächst.  
Dieses Papier analysiert somit die Sensitivität des aggregierten Spendenaufkommens in Be-
zug sowohl auf konjunkturelle Schwankungen als auch auf Trendwachstum. Zur Anwendung 
kommen Zeitreihenmodelle, wie sich auch für Analysen des Zusammenhangs zwischen Steu-
ereinnahmen und Wachstum Verwendung finden. Die Modellierung als Kointegrationsbezie-
hung erlaubt es, eine Langfristbeziehung zu berücksichtigen, die von kurzfristigen konjunktu-
rellen Einflüssen überlagert ist. Das resultierende Fehler-Korrektur-Modell ermöglicht es, 
kurzfristige (konjunkturbezogene) Einkommenselastizitäten von den langfristigen (trend-
wachstumbezogenen) Elastizitäten zu unterscheiden. Das Modell wird auf US-Daten für einen 
vierzigjährigen Zeitraum (1968-2008) angewendet. Einbezogen wird das Spendenaufkommen 
insgesamt und seine Komponenten: individuelle Spenden, Unternehmensspenden, Stiftungs-
spenden und Erbschaften für wohltätige Zwecke. 
Im Vergleich zum Referenzfall des Steueraufkommens, stellt das US-Spendenaufkommen 
tatsächlich eine relative stabile Finanzierungsquelle dar. Das Spendenaufkommen insgesamt 
ist durch eine konjunkturelle Volatilität gekennzeichnet, die derjenigen der indirekten Steuern 
entspricht. Hinter diesem Gesamtbild verbergen sich allerdings sehr unterschiedliche Kurz-
fristelastizitäten der verschiedenen Spenden-Komponenten. Während Individual- und Unter-
nehmens-Spenden recht sensitiv auf konjunkturelle Schwankungen reagieren, stabilisieren 
Spenden von Stiftungen und durch Erbschaften das aggregierte Spendenaufkommen über den 
Konjunkturzyklus. Diese Pufferfunktion von wohltätigen Vermächtnissen und Stifungsfinan-
zierungen ist bislang in der Literatur zu wenig beachtet worden. 
Die Ergebnisse in Bezug auf das nominale (und noch starker das reale) Langfrist-Wachstum 
ergeben ebenfalls ein vorteilhaftes Bild: Das Spendenaufkommen profitiert überproportional 
von der Vermehrung der ökonomischen Ressourcen einer Volkswirtschaft. Dies gilt beson-
ders ausgeprägt für die Stiftungsfinanzierung, die sehr elastisch auf nominales und reales 
Wachstum reagiert.  
Der Vergleich dieser Resultate mit den Elastizitäten der mikroökonometrischen Spenden-
Literatur deutet auf die Existenz sozialer Multiplikatoren für das US-Spendenverhalten hin: 
Die Makro-Elastizitäten sind im oberen Bereich des aus den Mikro-Studien bekannten Ban-
des. Dieser Befund ist konsistent mit der Existenz sozialer Multiplikatoren und der wechsel-
seitigen Verstärkung individueller Spendenaktivitäten. 
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1. Introduction 
Given the substantial consolidation pressure in tax dependent government budgets, voluntary 
contributions play an increasing role in the financing of activities related to welfare, culture or 
education. There is hope that giving may at least partially become a stable substitute for tax 
financing. The financing of public or semi-public activities through voluntary giving instead 
of coercive taxation has some obvious advantages: From an efficiency point of view it should 
be superior since voluntary giving is by definition not compulsory but the result of the indi-
vidual’s optimizing decision. The voluntary donor is free to choose among beneficiaries and 
giving purposes while tax payments as such do not offer any impact on provision of public 
goods. Hence, shifting financing from taxation to voluntary giving clearly fosters a supply of 
services with a better fit to the preferences of the citizens. Furthermore, while a “warm glow” 
may accompany the act of giving (Andreoni, 1990), paying taxes is rarely associated with a 
feeling of pleasure. On the contrary, the experimental literature points to the phenomenon of 
“tax aversion” where the labeling of a monetary charge as “tax” arouses a negative reaction 
(McCaffery and Baron, 2005). 
This being said, this paper deals with a further potential advantage of giving over paying 
taxes: the possibility that giving may be a more stable source of revenues than taxes over the 
business cycle. Tax revenues are highly sensitive to economic growth and the business cycle. 
Economic downturns regularly put government budgets under stress – a phenomenon highly 
relevant in the historic global recession following the financial crisis of 2008. Hence, a first 
question arises as to which extent voluntary giving is equally sensitive to the business cycle. 
Insofar it is less elastic compared to taxation it might contribute to a more stable financing of 
public goods over the business cycle. In this case, this kind of financing would not only be 
more efficient but also be more reliable in a volatile economic environment. A second ques-
tion relates to the long-run impact of trend growth on giving and to the extent to which giving 
benefits from the augmentation of an economy’s economic resources. If the long-run growth 
elasticity of aggregate giving is large, this result would point to a yielding source of finance 
whose importance can be expected to grow over the decades.  
Therefore, this paper analyzes the sensitivity of aggregate giving to both business cycle de-
velopments and trend growth. In this respect it contributes to fill a blank spot in the charitable 
giving literature. While there is a wealth of microeconomic studies on the determinants of 
charitable giving, approaches with a rather macroeconomic perspective are largely absent.  
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The study applies time series modeling which follows approaches developed to analyze the 
tax revenue-growth-nexus. The cointegration modeling takes account of a possible long-run 
link between income and giving which may temporarily interfere with cyclical fluctuations. 
The resulting error correction specification allows disentangling the short-run (business cycle 
related) from the long-run (potential growth related) income elasticity. It thus allows assess-
ing both the cyclical volatility of giving and its long-run link to trend growth. This modeling 
is applied to data on US giving for a forty-year period (1968-2008) for the aggregate of total 
giving and for its subcomponents (individual, corporate, foundation and charitable bequests). 
Robustness tests are applied to take account of the specificities of the sub-components, such 
as the impact of (changing) tax incentives on individual or corporate giving or to examine the 
impact of an inflationary environment. To the best of our knowledge this is the first approach 
to apply modern time series modeling to the link between giving aggregates and economic 
growth. Earlier literature on the time path of US giving as Clotfelter (1985b for corporate giv-
ing, or cited in there) do not yet pay attention to problems of potential spuriousness of results 
of regressions based on non-stationary time series or to the differentiation between the impact 
of the business cycle versus long-run growth. 
The results reveal that the aggregate of US giving has a short-run GDP elasticity of around 
one which is comparable to the elasticity of indirect taxes. However, the sub-component GDP 
elasticities differ substantially: Whereas individual and in particular corporate giving is quite 
sensitive to cyclical fluctuations, foundation giving and charitable bequests tend to stabilize 
total giving over the business cycle. The long-run elasticity indeed points to a yielding source 
of finance with a growth rate exceeding that of GDP. 
The paper’s structure is as follows: In section 2 the two key points of reference in the litera-
ture are summarized which relate to microeconometric findings and macro-estimates. Section 
3 introduces the data and describes the tax environment of US giving and its variation over 
time which has to be taken into account in the testing. Subsequently, in section 4 the dynamic 
modeling together with the econometric testing is presented, followed by the overall conclu-
sions. 
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2. Income elasticities of giving and tax revenues 
The analysis can be related to two points of reference, first to the income elasticity of tax 
revenues as identified in the macroeconomic time series literature and second to the individ-
ual income and price elasticity of giving as identified in micro-econometric studies. The for-
mer is the point of reference with respect to methodology and in order to judge how voluntary 
giving performs relative to taxation with respect to its growth elasticity. The latter gives a first 
indication which elasticities might be plausible on an aggregate level.  
 
Macroeconomic income elasticities of tax revenue 
Analytically, different approaches exist to quantify the income elasticity of tax revenues (van 
den Noord, 2000): One option is to run a regression with tax proceeds as the dependent and a 
measure of output as the explanatory variable. The estimation coefficient for output (depend-
ent and independent variables as logarithms) would then constitute the estimation of εT Y, the 
income elasticity of tax revenues. The difficulty of this approach is, however, to disentangle 
growth driven fluctuations of tax revenues from those caused by changing tax laws. Hence, 
policy variables have to be included among the explanatory variables.  
A second option is based on a two-step procedure (van den Noord, 2000; Girouard and André, 
2005). The income elasticity of tax revenues, εT Y, is derived as the product of two compo-
nents: the elasticity of tax proceeds with respect to the tax base, εT TB, and the elasticity of the 
tax base with respect to GDP, εTB Y. 
(1)  YTBTBTYT εεε *=  
While the income elasticity of the tax base can only be determined econometrically, the tax 
base elasticity of tax revenues is a function of the tax system’s features. For a purely propor-
tionate type of tax the value is unity, for a progressive (regressive) tax the elasticity is above 
(below) one. Note that with a non-proportionate type of tax, it is necessary to have informa-
tion on the income distribution in addition to knowledge of the tax system to derive an aggre-
gate measure for the elasticities.  
This second option based on a two-step procedure is the common one in the context of the 
calculation of cyclically adjusted government budget balances. Table 1 summarizes the cur-
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rent elasticities employed by the OECD to adjust for the cyclical component of tax revenues 
in the case of the US, the country of examination. According to these results social security 
contributions are rather inelastic whereas both income and corporate tax revenues fluctuate 
strongly in the course of the business cycle and tend to induce deficits in a cyclical down-
swing. 
These tax revenue elasticities offer the first point of reference when it comes to evaluating the 
giving elasticities. The latter are harder to identify, since giving is not driven by a well de-
fined tax tariff but by individuals’ optimizing behavior. Section 4 returns to this issue. 
 
Table 1: US tax elasticities in OECD approach of cyclical adjustment 
 Income tax+ Indirect tax++ Social security 
contribution+ 
Corporate tax+++ 
εTB Y 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.5 
εT TB 1.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 
εT Y 1.3 1.0 0.6 1.5 
Source: (Girouard and André, 2005); +tax base measure: wage bill; ++by assumption “following a common prac-
tice .. and given the econometric difficulties in finding consistent estimates across countries” (Girouard and 
André, 2005: p. 17); +++ tax base measure: profits.  
 
Elasticity of giving in the micro-econometric literature 
In contrast to the virtually non-existent macroeconometric approaches, the micro-strand of the 
literature on the drivers of giving is rich. Two elasticities are the focus of this literature: both 
the income and the (tax) price elasticity of charitable giving. This reflects the insight that vol-
untary giving should react both to the disposable income and its tax price. Without any tax 
incentives the price of giving one Dollar is equal to one. With giving deductible from taxable 
income, this reduces the price of giving to one minus the marginal income tax rate (Steinberg, 
1990) and should affect behavior.  
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Clotfelter (1985a) and Steinberg (1990) offer early literature reviews. Clotfelter reports an 
income elasticity of giving of 0.7 as typical of estimates from earlier studies. Steinberg pro-
vides a meta-analysis about the income elasticity by surveying 24 studies which estimate the 
impact of changes in after-tax income on personal donations in the US and Canada. The elas-
ticities assessed were all positive, ranging from 0.02 to 2.68 (see Figure 1), whereas the ma-
jority of observations is smaller than 1, clustering between 0.5 and 0.6 with a mean of 0.61 
(standard deviation 0.43). With respect to price elasticity the results are more disparate (see 
Figure 2): According to the Steinberg meta-analysis, the range is from -4.8 to +2.9 with a 
mean at -1.06 (standard deviation 1.29). A more recent meta-analysis of Peloza and Steel 
(2005) estimates the weighted mean of the price elasticity of giving to be -1.44, with a stan-
dard deviation of 1.21. This literature is far advanced and covers numerous differentiations 
such as the particular elasticity of different charitable purposes (Schiff, 1990) or the price re-
sponsiveness of itemizers versus non-itemizers (Duquette, 1999). Methodological refinements 
address measurement errors in tax data related to tax evasion (Joulfaian and Rider, 2004) or 
evaluate survey-based versus tax-data-based approaches (Tiehen, 2001). While the earlier 
studies were confined to cross-sectional data from household surveys or individual tax re-
turns, the more recent ones use panel data, largely from tax returns (such as Auten, Sieg and 
Clotfelter, 2002). Further extensions also apply similar approaches to corporate giving 
(Clotfelter, 1985b; Auten, Cilke and Randolph, 1992) and charitable bequests (Joulfaian, 
1991; Joulfaian, 2000). Increasingly, this literature also spreads to non-Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, such as Germany (Borgloh, 2008). 
There are two reasons why these micro-elasticities do not immediately translate into macro-
elasticities without modification. The link between aggregate income growth on the one hand 
and aggregate giving on the other hand does not only depend on the individuals’ reactions. It 
is also affected by shifts in the distribution of the population across income classes and across 
other characteristics which can be controlled for in the micro-studies but not in macro-
approaches. Even for long-run time series the low number of observations precludes a com-
prehensive control. Thus, the ceteris paribus assumption with respect to socio-economic or 
cultural factors, which holds for well designed micro-studies, is not valid for aggregate ap-
proaches. Beyond that aspect, a more subtle explanation can drive a wedge between micro- 
and macro-elasticities: In their theory of “social multipliers”, Glaeser et al. (2003) point to the 
fact that aggregate behavioral reactions may differ from reactions measured on the micro level 
due to social interactions: If one person’s actions influence his neighbor’s behavior, micro-
reaction may reinforce each other. They find evidence for this for the impact of education on 
7 
wages and demographics on crime. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) argue that social 
multipliers can explain the high tax elasticity of labor supply on the aggregate level which 
contrasts with the findings of micro-studies: Since the individual utility from leisure con-
sumption is a function of one’s friends’ and relatives’ leisure consumption, social relations 
will tend to increase elasticities above the level detected for individual behavior in isolation. It 
is obvious that this idea of a social multiplier could be relevant in the context of giving as 
well, as also some hints in the micro-literature suggest: In their analysis of a mail fundraising 
campaign Frey and Meier (2004) show that social information on the generosity of others 
increases the willingness to give. For survey data Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) do not and  
Andreoni and Scholz (1998) do find a small impact of giving of the peer group on own giv-
ing. These considerations and blurred micro-results underline the importance of accompany-
ing macro-studies: Differences between macro- and micro-approaches can serve as an indica-
tor for the existence and empirical relevance of social multipliers of giving. 
 
 
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of income elasticities of charitable giving 
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Results on income elasticities of giving from meta-study (Steinberg, 1990). Includes 47 results from 24 studies, 
21/3 refer to US/UK data. 
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of price elasticities of charitable giving 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Price elasticity  
Results on income elasticities of giving from meta-study (Steinberg, 1990). Includes 47 results from 24 studies, 
21/3 refer to US/UK data. 
 
3. Data and tax incentives 
For the analysis a database of US giving is used which was provided by the Giving USA 
Foundation.1 This database currently provides time series for a period of 41 years (1968 to 
2008) on total giving and four subcomponents: giving of individuals, corporations, founda-
tions and charitable bequests.2 Figure 3 depicts the time series together with US GDP. US 
giving is dominated by individual giving which amounts to three quarters of the total aggre-
gate for the most recent data. Rank 2 is foundation giving with a share of 13 per cent in the 
year 2008, followed by bequests (7 per cent) and the corporate sector (5 per cent). In the 
course of the four decades under scrutiny, some shifts in the composition of giving have oc-
curred. The importance of foundation giving has almost doubled compared to its average 
                                                 
1 According to information from Giving USA the data are based on different sources: tax data from corporations, 
tax data from income tax itemizers and data US charities have to provide for the Internal Revenue Service annu-
ally (through IRS form 990 which has to be submitted by tax-exempt and non-profit organizations).  
2 Note that this data structure implies some double counting (Clotfelter, 1985c): Foundations accumulate their 
wealth from voluntary giving and use this wealth and its yields to give for the foundations’ purposes. This inter-
mediating function of foundation affects the time path of giving aggregate so that an inclusion of foundation 
giving is important in a study which has a focus on aggregate giving dynamics. 
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share in the 1970s. The reversed development occurred for the share of individual giving 
which, initially dominated total giving even more.  
The visual inspection also reveals that there is a link of giving to GDP growth although the 
evolution of giving aggregates has not the smoothness of GDP. One reason may be a varying 
tax incentive environment. As shown by the microeconometric literature, individual giving 
cannot be understood satisfactorily without taking into account the price of giving determined 
by tax advantages. However, these tax incentives vary over time. 
 
Figure 3: Giving in the US 1968-2008 
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Source: Giving USA Foundation  
 
While the system parameters change, the current US system of tax incentives for charitable 
giving has been in place over the whole sample period and long before, dating back to 1917 
(Randolph, 2005). Since then, individual federal taxpayers have been allowed to deduct gifts 
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to charitable and certain non-profit organizations in the US from their taxable income. The 
condition is that taxpayers make their contributions to a qualified organization. Among those 
eligible are non-profit groups that are religious, charitable, educational, scientific, or literary 
in purpose, or that work to prevent cruelty to children or animals. The tax incentive was moti-
vated to subsidize organizations that provide substitutes to government programs. The spe-
cific reason of the 1917 introduction was a tax increase. The deduction was intended to coun-
terbalance disincentives of the higher tax burden for private charity. While it was first limited 
to individual taxpayers, corporations were also allowed a deduction starting in 1935.3 Hence, 
the system in place over the period under investigations sets particular incentives for individ-
ual and corporate giving. Similarly, the privileged treatment of charitable bequests under the 
estate tax dates back long before the sample starts: The modern estate tax was enacted in 1916 
and charitable deductions were granted in 1918 (Jacobson, Raub and Johnson, 2007). Finally, 
the structural features of the tax treatment of foundations have also been stable for the period 
under scrutiny: the foundations are allowed to accumulate income without taxation and bene-
fit on the revenue side from the preferential tax treatment of their donors in income and cor-
porate tax schemes (Clotfelter, 1985c).  
Given a stable basic incentive system in the period under investigation, the time series varia-
tion of the price of giving is determined by the tax level. It therefore depends on changes in 
tax tariffs in the case of individual giving (income tax rate), corporate giving (corporate tax 
rate) and charitable bequests (estate tax rate). Because the privileged tax treatment of founda-
tions is independent from their payouts, there is no tax price calculus for foundations analo-
gous to the one for individual and corporate giving or charitable bequests. In the empirical 
specification a simple tax price of giving proxy is employed, which is defined to be one minus 
the top marginal federal income tax rate (with data on tax rate history from National Taxpay-
ers Union) for individual giving, one minus the (flat or top) corporate income tax rate (with 
data from OECD) for corporate giving and one minus the top estate tax (data from Jacobson, 
Raub and Johnson, 2007). The tax price construction is confined to the federal tax and ab-
                                                 
3 Further structural changes occurred since 1935 in the tax treatment of corporate giving (Boatsman and Gupta, 
1996): In 1953, before the starting year of the sample, the “direct benefit doctrine” was given up, according to 
which corporate contributions were only deductible if they yielded a “direct benefit” in terms of a profit increase 
to the corporation. One structural break for the tax treatment of corporate giving, however, falls into the sample 
period: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 doubled the limit of deductable contributions from five to ten 
percent of net income before contributions. 
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stract from state taxation. The time series variation is considerable: While top income tax 
rates amounted to 75 per cent in 1968, they declined to 28 per cent in the late eighties with a 
subsequently rising trend. Corporate income tax declined from 53 to a minimum of 34 per 
cent in 1988 with a subsequent slight rise. The top estate tax dropped from 77 (up to the year 
1976) to 45 per cent in 2007. To cope with shifts in the distribution of income taxpayers other 
measures were employed, such as one minus the tax rate of an average income earner. How-
ever, this did not improve the significance of the tax price covariates in the subsequent regres-
sion.  
 
4. Dynamic modeling and estimation 
The methods developed to measure the growth related fluctuation of tax revenues are the 
natural starting point for the modeling of the GDP elasticity of voluntary giving. The two-step 
logic of the analytical problem as described in section 2 in the context of tax revenues remains 
valid. The aggregate income elasticity of giving, εG Y, can also be modeled as the product of 
two components: the elasticity of giving with respect to the “giving base” (the analogy to the 
tax base), εG GB, and the elasticity of the giving base with respect to aggregate income, εGB Y. 
The giving base resembles the tax base insofar as it is the economic aggregate from which 
resources are financed. 
(2) YGBGBGYG εεε *=  
Although the structure of (1) and (2) appears identical the highly different economic character 
of the first right-hand side elasticity must be emphasized. While in equation (1) this term is 
defined by the tax tariff it depicts a behavioral parameter in the context of giving which, by 
definition, describes a pattern of voluntary behavior and is not directly affected by determinis-
tic and legally defined constraints.4 This difference also precludes any approach which would 
derive εG GB directly from system features. Instead, both εG GB and εGB Y have to be quantified 
econometrically. While it is desirable to disentangle the two right hand side elasticities it is 
                                                 
4 Even for taxes one could argue that the link is not completely deterministic given the leeway of tax subjects to 
avoid or evade taxation. 
12 
equally possible to estimate εG Y directly in a one-step approach, if for example a sensible 
giving base is not available. 
The estimation model is based on a flexible and general dynamic framework (Hendry, 1995, 
Ch. 7) which allows for different specifications that correspond to the time series properties of 
the included variable. For the one-step approach5, giving (g, logarithm) depends on both cur-
rent and lagged values of income (y, logarithm) and an autoregressive term. The error term, 
μt, represents non-systematic shocks on giving such as outstanding natural disasters which 
push giving temporarily: 
(3) ttttt gyyg μββββ ++++= −− 11210 3  
Rearranging terms of this autoregressive distributed lag specification results into 
(4) ttttt gyyg μβββββ +−−++Δ+=Δ −− 112110 )1()( 3  
with an equivalent error correction representation 
(5) ttttt ygyg μφλββ +−−Δ+=Δ −− ][ 1110  
where )1( 3βλ −=  and )1/()( 321 βββφ −+= . 
The error correction representation is of crucial importance to disentangle the long-run in-
come elasticity of giving from the short-run elasticity. Whereas β1 represents the short-run 
elasticity related to a cyclical move of income, φ represents the long-run reaction. Hence, the 
dexter bracket term in (5) represents the divergence from the long-run equilibrium between 
giving and income, and λ indicates the speed of adjustment to restore divergence from equi-
librium. Note that an estimation of equation (4) is sufficient to derive estimates for both the 
short- and long-run elasticities in focus. While (4) describes the estimable specification for a 
two variable error correction it can easily be augmented to include a third variable which 
could be the tax price in addition to income as a driver of giving.  
                                                 
5 The two-step approach is equivalent – the equivalent dynamic modelling can be applied to both steps: first to 
the link between income and the giving base and second to the link between the giving base and giving. 
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This error correction modeling is a legitimate approach if the two (or more) time series in-
cluded are characterized by certain characteristics. Time series estimations based on variables 
in levels require that dependent and independent variables are stationary. Otherwise meaning-
less spurious estimations are produced (Granger and Newbold, 1974). With non-stationary 
variables, the error correction approach is possible only if a long-run link indeed exists be-
tween the variables6, i.e. these variables are tied together through a cointegrating relationship. 
If the variables included are non-stationary (e.g. of order one) but no cointegration exists, the 
dynamic modeling must be limited to a specification based on first differences (which fulfill 
the stationarity requirements but do not assume a long-run link in levels). 
Therefore, preparatory testing is needed which determines the order of integration of the time 
series involved and which reveals whether a cointegration relationship exists. Even though the 
available unit root and cointegration tests rarely produce unequivocal results they are indis-
pensable to judge to which extent the described dynamic modeling is appropriate. 
 
Unit root and cointegration tests 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the Advanced Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests for the variables 
included in the analysis. The tests on the levels of all giving aggregates clearly indicate that 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected whereas the rejection is highly sig-
nificant for the first differences. Hence, all giving aggregates can be treated as integrated of 
order one. The same results hold for GDP, the disposable income and the tax prices. Only the 
testing for corporate profits points to a possible stationarity of the level variable.  
 
                                                 
6 This is only possible if the variables have the same order of integration.  
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Table 2: ADF Tests for Unit Roots Results 
 ADF test statistic logarithmic levels 
ADF test statistic 
first differences 
Giving   
Total -1.01 -4.57*** 
Individual -1.15 -4.31*** 
Corporate 0.41 -7.44*** 
Foundations 0.99 -5.44*** 
Bequests -2.39 -2.39*** 
GDP 1.14 -4.43*** 
Disposable income 1.03 -6.70*** 
Corporate profits -3.74** -4.32*** 
Tax price income tax -1.35 -5.36*** 
Tax price corporate tax  -2.34 -4.60*** 
Tax price bequests -1.94 -4.62*** 
Constant and time trend included as deterministic regressors; choice of lag length 
based on Schwartz criterion. ***/**/*: Null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be re-
jected with significance level of 1/5/10 per cent. 
 
The picture is less clear cut for cointegration tests whose results are presented in Table 3. 
Both the single equation Engle Granger test and the Johansen procedure point to the cointe-
gration of GDP on the one hand and disposable income and corporate profits on the other 
hand (the giving bases with respect to individual and corporate giving). At least the Johansen 
test also supports cointegration for the link between all giving types and GDP or alternative 
giving bases with the exception of the link between bequests and GDP. But in this case the 
Engle Granger approach indicates cointegration. For three variable relationships including the 
measure of taxation the Johansen test is superior since single equation tests are less powerful 
for relationships of more than two variables. Here, individual giving, disposable income and 
the tax price appear to be tied together in a long-run cointegrating equation. The same holds 
for the relationship between corporate profits, the tax price of corporate giving and GDP or 
corporate profits. For the link  between charitable bequests, GDP and the (estate) tax price the 
Johansen tests does not point to cointegration whereas the single equation test does. For total 
giving no three variable cointegration is supported which is not implausible given that taxes 
should not affect all sub-components of giving. Overall it appears legitimate to submit these 
relationships to an error correction testing procedure. 
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Table 3: Cointegration Tests 
Relationship Engle Granger τ Johansen trace 
Disposable income – GDP -5.46*** 42.60*** 
Corporate profits – GDP  -4.37*** 25.12*** 
Total giving – GDP -1.86 13.62* 
Individual giving – GDP -1.87 14.01* 
Individual giving – disposable income -2.08 36.50*** 
Corporate giving – GDP -5.46*** 33.84*** 
Corporate giving – corporate profits -2.65 15.59** 
Foundation giving – GDP -1.42 16.80** 
Bequests – GDP  -3.66** 11.88 
Individual giving – GDP – tax price 
income tax -2.95 21.46 
Individual giving – disposable income 
– tax price income tax -3.19 46.00*** 
Corporate giving – GDP – tax price 
corporate tax -3.16 46.24*** 
Corporate giving – corporate profits – 
tax price corporate tax -2.76 28.38* 
Bequest giving – GDP – tax price 
estate tax -4.22** 17.67 
Total giving – GDP – tax price in-
come tax -2.44 20.34 
Engle Granger: critical values from MacKinnon (1996), null hypothesis: single equa-
tion residuals are non-stationary; Johansen: critical values from MacKinnon, Haug 
and Michelis (1999), null hypothesis: no cointegrating relation. ***/**/*: Null hy-
pothesis of no cointegration relationship can be rejected with significance level of 
1/5/10 per cent. 
 
 
Identifying elasticities 
In the following, the elasticities are measured based on an estimation of equation (4). This 
approach is applied to each sub-category of US giving and to total giving. For two giving sub-
categories a two-step procedure is workable since it is possible to define and quantify a poten-
tial giving base for these categories. In case of individual giving disposable personal income 
is the straightforward giving base since it determines the private households’ capability to 
consume and donate. 
In case of corporate giving profits could be an adequate giving base depending on the relevant 
underlying function of corporate giving. Two competing models exist in the literature in this 
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regard (Clotfelter, 1985b; Boatsman and Gupta, 1996): Giving of corporations can either be 
understood as part of a profit maximization calculus where giving is an input to production 
which e.g. stimulates demand for a firm’s products. Alternatively, it can be seen as an activity 
of managers’ utility maximization for whom giving creates utility at the costs of owners. With 
managerial utility maximization being the relevant explanation one would expect a strong link 
to profits since then profit variation impacts on the available leeway of managers to distract 
resources from owner compensation. With profit maximization, however, one would rather 
expect a link to the corporation level of economic activity because like any other input factor, 
giving would be driven by the output level rather than by the issue of corporate profitability. 
Therefore, the two-step procedure is of particular interest in the case of corporate giving: If 
profits turn out to be the relevant giving base this points towards models of managerial discre-
tion as the relevant ones for understanding charitable activities of the corporate sector. 
For charitable bequests, the micro-evidence points towards the role of private wealth as the 
relevant giving base (Barrett, 1991; Joulfaian, 1991; Joulfaian, 2000). However, aggregates 
for US personal wealth are only available for some single years at the IRS Statistics of In-
come Division so that the time series necessary for inclusion in the testing does not exist. 
Therefore, the testing is limited to the one-step procedure which directly analyzes the link 
between charitable bequests and GDP. The same procedure applies to foundation giving 
where a quantification of a meaningful giving base is not available either.  
Table 4 presents the first-step estimations for individual and corporate giving. These results 
reveal that corporate profits have a high short-run GDP elasticity of 3.29 whereas disposable 
income reacts inelastically (0.67). This difference still exists for the long-run elasticities al-
though less drastic (long-run GDP elasticities amounting to 1.01 for disposable income and 
1.46 for corporate profits). The much better regression fit for disposable income reveals that 
there is indeed a close link between GDP and disposable income while the GDP link is much 
looser for corporate profits. 
Tables 5-9 include the regression results for the giving sub-components and total giving. For 
individual and corporate giving 2 x 2 specifications are tested: the second-step of the two-step 
procedure and the single-step estimation (i.e. the direct giving-GDP-link), each of them both 
including and excluding the tax price as an element of the cointegration relationship. For 
charitable bequests  the analysis is confined to the one-step procedure including the estate tax 
price. For foundations due to their privileged tax treatment a tax price is irrelevant and not 
included. The total giving specifications are run with and without the income tax price. 
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The key interest in the estimation findings is the measurement of giving elasticities. However, 
some observations on the overall regression results are telling. The comparison of the good-
ness of fit of estimation models results in considerable differences: For individual giving the 
one-step estimations which link giving directly to GDP tend to produce a better regression fit 
compared to the disposable income specification. The corporate giving estimations (Table 6) 
which relate giving to corporate profits (columns 3 and 4) fail to be well specified whereas the 
direct GDP related specification performs satisfactorily (columns 1 and 2). Corporate giving 
appears to be rather related to general economic activity than to corporate profits. This may 
indicate that giving of companies resembles the remuneration of a fixed factor of production 
which cannot be cut back in a situation of a sudden profit squeeze. Apart from that, the good-
ness of fit indicates a particularly poor performance of the error correction estimation for 
foundation giving (Table 7). This comes hardly as a surprise since the financing base of foun-
dation giving – the foundations’ capital receipts – should have a comparably loose link to 
GDP growth. 
The inclusion of the tax price of giving into the dynamic modeling results in significant coef-
ficients for individual giving under the disposable income specification (column 4 in Table 5) 
and for corporate giving under the GDP specification (column 2 in Table 6). The reaction of 
individual giving to the tax price appears, however, to be quite inelastic: The short-run in-
come elasticity amounts to -0.16 and the long-run (missing to reach significance) to -0.30. For 
corporate giving no significant short-run tax elasticity can be measured but the long-run elas-
ticity is significant and amounts to -1.17. For charitable bequests the short-run estate tax price 
elasticity is -0.70 but falls short of accepted significance levels, the long-run elasticity is of a 
similar magnitude (-0.84) and again misses significance. It is not surprising that the income 
tax price is insignificant for total giving given the mixed character of this aggregate and the 
differentiated incentives of different taxes for the sub-components of giving 
 
Short- and long-run elasticities 
Tables 10 and 11 summarize the findings on income elasticities. These elasticities are in the 
centre of interest since they inform about the growth-giving link. Before embarking on the 
detailed findings the different perspectives of the short- and long-run elasticities should be 
emphasized. The short-run elasticities are informative with respect to the immediate impact of 
GDP fluctuations on giving aggregates. Hence, they indicate to which extent business cycle 
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fluctuations tend to destabilize the financing base of giving dependent activities. The long-run 
elasticities convey a very different message and illustrate to which extent the particular giving 
aggregate can benefit from the trend growth of an economy’s available economic resources.  
Comparing the short-run GDP elasticities across giving subcomponents (Table 10), corporate 
giving stands out to be highly elastic. However, the two-step decomposition reveals that the 
very high cyclical volatility of corporate profits does not translate into GDP-elasticity without 
substantial moderation. Individual giving fluctuates quite exactly in proportion to GDP devel-
opments if one takes into account the impact of the tax price on short-run dynamics. Founda-
tion giving is not affected significantly by cyclical developments. For bequests, the only mar-
ginally significant negative elasticity hardly signals more than this aggregate’s peculiarity 
results from the fact that death determines the timing of bequests rather than the business cy-
cle. If one compares these finding on cyclical sensitivity with the knowledge of tax revenue 
volatility as a point of reference (Table 1) the patterns turn out to be comparable. Both corpo-
rate taxes and corporate giving are the most GDP-elastic component with the size of elasticity 
being similar (around 1.5 for taxes and between 1.6 and 2 for giving). Equally, the GDP-
elasticity of income tax revenues resembles that of individual giving. Giving as a whole is 
characterized by a GDP-elasticity not larger than one and is in this respect comparable to the 
cyclical properties of indirect tax revenues. Giving components detached from short-run fluc-
tuations obviously compensate for the higher elasticity of corporate giving.  
Long-run elasticities differ from the short-run dynamics with respect to foundation giving and 
bequests. These two giving sub-components benefit from long-run growth in a significant 
way although no significant positive short-run link to GDP exists. Interestingly, the point es-
timate for the long-run elasticity of foundation giving is the largest across all sub-components. 
The financing base of foundations appears to benefit substantially from US long-run growth. 
While individual long-run giving elasticities are of a similar magnitude as for the short-run, 
corporate long-run giving elasticities tend to be closer to the proportionate area than the short-
run ones. Giving as a whole is not significantly different from a 1.0-elasticity.   
 
Real growth elasticities 
So far, the analytical setting has dealt with growth without paying interest to the difference 
between inflation driven nominal growth on the one hand and real growth on the other hand. 
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Therefore, the estimations are reiterated on the basis of deflated time series, using the GDP 
deflator.7 The resulting elasticity estimates are summarized in Table 11. While point estimates 
are somewhat larger than it is the case for the nominal estimates, the differences are not sub-
stantial with the exception of foundation giving. Foundation giving appears even more elastic 
if one concentrates on real growth processes. 
Finally, the size of these macro-elasticities can be compared with the evidence from micro-
studies briefly surveyed in section 2. The macro view hints towards elasticities which tend to 
be above the average micro-estimates for individual giving. This difference must be inter-
preted with some caution due to the different character of approaches. However, this finding 
is consistent with the existence of social multipliers where the impact of growth on giving is 
reinforced by the mutual influence of individual households’ and companies’ giving. If this 
type of interaction exists, micro-approaches tend to underestimate the size of aggregate in-
come elasticities. These findings stress that this might actually be the case for US giving. 
 
Table 4: Giving bases and GDP 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Δ log 
dispos. 
income 
Δ log 
corporate 
profits 
Constant -0.16** 
(-2.28) 
-1.29** 
(-2.72) 
Δ log GDP 0.67*** 
(8.52) 
3.29*** 
(3.06) 
log GDP(-1) 0.48*** 
(3.98) 
0.25** 
(2.48) 
log dispos. income (-1) -0.47*** 
(-4.06) 
 
Log corporate profits (-1)  -0.17** 
(-2.04) 
Number of observations 40 40 
Log likelihood 133.39 29.69 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 78.43 3.75 
Adjusted R-squared 0.86 0.17 
t-statistics in parentheses, */**/***: significance of 10/5/1 per cent. 
 
                                                 
7 The results are robust to a replacement of the GDP deflator by the deflator for private consumption to derive a 
measure of real giving. 
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Table 5: Individual giving estimations  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.79** 
(-2.18) 
-0.91** 
(-2.33) 
-0.76** 
(-2.20) 
-0.82** 
(-2.36) 
Δ log GDP 1.24*** 
(3.51) 
0.98** 
(2.45) 
  
log GDP(-1) 0.17* 
(2.02) 
0.24** 
(2.28) 
  
Δ log dispos. income   1.07** 
(2.37) 
0.82* 
(1.73) 
log dispos. income (-1)  
 
0.18** 
(2.18) 
0.26** 
(2.44) 
Δ log tax price  -0.10 
(-1.18) 
 
-0.16** 
(-2.10) 
Log tax price (-1)  -0.06 
(1.18) 
 
-0.07 
(-1.30) 
log individual giving (-1) -0.15* 
(-1.87) 
-0.20** 
(-2.19) 
-0.17** 
(-2.08) 
-0.23** 
(-2.39) 
Number of observations 40 40 40 40 
Log likelihood 73.42 74.55 70.33 73.00 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 6.69 4.41 4.02 3.57 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.19 0.25 
Dependent variable: Δ log individual giving, t-statistics in parentheses, */**/***: 
significance of 10/5/1 per cent. 
Table 6: Corporate giving estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -3.03*** 
(-3.22) 
-1.96 
(-1.66) 
-0.18 
(-0.83) 
1.48 
(1.22) 
Δ log GDP 1.63** 
(2.35) 
1.29* 
(1.80) 
  
log GDP(-1) 0.42*** 
(3.10) 
0.54*** 
(3.26) 
  
Δ log corporate profits   0.17 
(1.59) 
0.26** 
(2.28) 
log corporate profits (-1)  
 
0.06 
(1.21) 
0.03 
(0.48) 
Δ log tax price  -0.24 
(-0.46) 
 
-0.28 
(-1.25) 
Log tax price (-1)  -0.48* 
(-1.69) 
 
-0.38 
(-1.25) 
log corporate giving (-1) -0.35*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.41*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.07 
(-1.45) 
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
Number of observations 40 40 40 40 
Log likelihood 48.79 50.42 41.76 44.10 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 7.27 5.05 1.56 1.84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.04 0.10 
Dependent variable: Δ log corporate giving, t-statistics in parentheses, */**/***: sig-
nificance of 10/5/1 per cent. 
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Table 7: Foundation giving estimation 
 (1) 
Constant -0.78** 
(-2.19) 
Δ log GDP 0.19 
(0.28) 
log GDP(-1) 0.12** 
(2.32) 
log foundation giving (-
1) 
-0.07* 
(-1.72) 
Number of observations 40 
Log likelihood 48.22 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 2.26 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 
Dependent variable: Δ log foundation giving, t-statistics in parentheses, */**/***: 
significance of 10/5/1 per cent. 
 
 
Table 8: Bequests estimation 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -1.79** 
(-2.45) 
-1.90** 
(-2.62) 
Δ log GDP -2.73* 
(-1.98) 
-2.00** 
(-2.14) 
log GDP(-1) 0.33*** 
(3.01) 
0.52*** 
(2.89) 
Δ log tax price  -0.70 
(-1.51) 
Log tax price (-1)  -0.37 
(-1.29) 
log bequests (-1) -0.37*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.44*** 
(-3.80) 
Number of observations 40 40 
Log likelihood 21.01 22.66 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 4.25 3.20 
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.22 
Dependent variable: Δ log bequests, t-statistics in parentheses, */**/***: significance 
of 10/5/1 per cent. 
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Table 9: Total giving estimations 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -0.59** 
(-2.04) 
-0.68** 
(-2.29) 
Δ log GDP 0.97** 
(2.71) 
0.72* 
(1.75) 
log GDP(-1) 0.13* 
(1.91) 
0.20** 
(2.34) 
Δ log tax price  -0.07 
(-0.83) 
Log tax price (-1)  -0.07 
(-1.35) 
log total giving (-1) -0.11* 
(-1.73) 
-0.16** 
(-2.15) 
Number of observations 40 40 
Log likelihood 73.49 74.58 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 4.76 3.23 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.22 
Dependent variable: Δ log total giving, t-statistics in parentheses, */**/***: signifi-
cance of 10/5/1 per cent. 
 
 
Table 10: Short-run GDP and giving base elasticities 
 Individual giving+ Corporate giving++ Foundation giving Bequests Total 
εGB Y 0.67*** 3.29*** - - - 
εG GB 1.07** (0.82*) 0.17 (0.26**) - - - 
εG Y 1.24***(0.98**) 1.63** (1.29*) 0.19 -2.73* (-2.99**) 0.97** (0.72*) 
+giving base measure: personal disposable income; ++giving base measure: corporate profits. εG Y estimated from 
one-step approach, hence not identical to εGB Y*εG GB. In parenthesis: estimates for specification with tax price 
included. */**/***: significance of 10/5/1 per cent. 
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Table 11: Long-run GDP and giving base elasticities 
 Individual giving+ Corporate giving++ Foundation giving Bequests  Total 
εGB Y 1.01*** 1.46** - - - 
εG GB 1.06** (1.14**) 0.86 (22.10) - - - 
εG Y 1.10* (1.17**) 1.20*** (1.32***) 1.61* 0.87*** (1.17***) 1.14* (1.25**) 
+giving base measure: personal disposable income; ++giving base measure: corporate profits. εG Y estimated from 
one-step approach, hence not identical to εGB Y*εG GB. In parenthesis: estimates for specification with tax price 
included. Long-run elasticity calculated as ratio of coefficient of lagged exogenous (level) divided by lagged 
endogenous variable, multiplied by (-1).  */**/***: significance of 10/5/1 per cent for least significant coefficient 
in ratio.  
 
Table 12: Short- and long-run GDP elasticities for inflation adjusted aggregates  
 Individual giving Corporate giving Foundation giving Bequests  Total 
εG Y 
short-run 
1.28*** 1.99*** 1.50*** -1.11 1.12** 
εG Y  
long-run 
1.18** 1.34*** 2.87* 1.23** 1.32* 
Time series inflation adjusted by GDP deflator. Long-run elasticity calculated as ratio of coefficient of lagged 
exogenous (level) divided by lagged endogenous variable, multiplied by (-1).  */**/***: significance of 10/5/1 
per cent for least significant coefficient in ratio. Underlying regressions obtainable from author.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
With tax revenues as a point of reference, US giving constitutes indeed a relatively stable 
source of revenue. Total giving is characterized by a business cycle volatility which is compa-
rable to the moderate one of indirect taxes. While giving thus by no means immunizes reve-
nues from cyclical developments it does not feed an unusual volatility into the financing sys-
tems of the related activities. However, this overall finding is composed of the respective sub-
components’ very different short-run GDP-elasticities. Whereas individual and in particular 
corporate giving is quite sensitive to cyclical fluctuations, foundation giving and charitable 
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bequests tend to stabilize total giving over the business cycle. This cyclical buffer function of 
charitable bequests and foundation giving has so far been overlooked in the literature. 
Beyond these results, the modeling approach offers the possibility to disentangle short- from 
long-run income elasticities. The former indicate to which extent business cycle fluctuations 
tend to destabilize the financing base of giving dependent activities. The latter inform to 
which extent the particular giving aggregate can benefit from the trend growth of an econ-
omy’s available economic resources. Here the results for nominal (and even more for real) 
long-run growth paint a favorable picture: giving benefits in or even above proportion from an 
augmentation of economic resources in an economy. This holds for foundation giving in par-
ticular which is highly elastic to nominal and real long-run growth. 
Further detailed results are to be underlined: The two-step approach, which takes account of a 
giving base as transmission channel, works much better for individual than for corporate giv-
ing. Disposable income has the character of a giving base for individual giving, while this is 
not the case for corporate profits in the case of corporate giving. The pattern of corporate giv-
ing resembles that of the remuneration for a fixed factor of production and thus is consistent 
with a profit maximizing view of corporate giving rather than manager utility maximization.  
Finally, the comparison of the finding to the well researched micro-elasticities points to the 
possible existence of social multipliers in the case of US giving: the macro estimates for the 
income elasticities lie in the upper band of the micro-estimates. This is consistent with a so-
cial multiplier view according to which individual giving is mutually reinforcing.  
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